I study the slow adoption of ring-spinning in Great Britain's cotton industry at the end of the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining e¢ciency and conservatism (Musson [1959] , Aldcroft, [1964], Lazonick [1981, 1981b]). To this purpose I use …rm-level data from all of Lancashire's cotton …rms over several years. The data are from the Worrall's Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Directories for the years 1885 , 1886 -1887 , 1890 , 1894 , 1902 , and 1910 show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its …rms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring-spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated …rms were the …rst to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of …rms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated …rms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of …rms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of …rms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that …rms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time.
Introduction
For decades, historians have been concerned with explaining the decline of Great Britain as the economic world leader after 1870. By the end of the 1890s, Britain had lost the industrial leadership of the world to Germany and the United States (McCloskey and Sandberg [1971] ). In an in ‡uential paper, Aldcroft [1964] argued that "Britain's poor economic performance can be attributed largely to the failure of the British entrepreneur to respond to the challenge of changed condition. This paper investigates whether the decline of Great Britain can be explained, at least in part, by the ineptitude of its entrepreneurs, as was argued by Aldcroft. To address this question, I look at one industrial case that has been at the center of a highly charged and often heated exchange spread out over a number of rounds and spanning several decades: the slow adoption by the British entrepreneurs of ring-spinning in yarn production. The main reason why the adoption of ring-spinning has received so much attention is because the British cotton industry was the most important export industry in Britain throughout the 19th century.
Since the mid 1880s, the new technique of ring-spinning had become economically viable in yarn production. 2 The production of yarn was faster with ring-spinning than with mule-spinning.
Furthermore, labor costs were lower. Ring-spinning was more e¢cient than mule-spinning: per unit of time, ring-spinning resulted in higher production at a lower labor costs. If British entrepreneurs 1 Aldcroft [1964] , p. 113 and p. 115. For a critical analysis of the full "damning catalogue" of the British entrepeneur's reasons of failure, see McCloskey and Sandberg [1971] . 2 Leunig [1996 Leunig [ , 2001 ] provides a review of the cotton manufacturing process and of the di¤erences between ring and mule spinning. He also provides a comprehensive review of the literature. Here, I present the key insights of the debate on the adoption of rings in Great Britain at the end of the 19th century.
had been pro…t maximizers, the indictment reads, they should have started adopting ring-spinning as soon as the early 1880s, when it became economically viable. Until 1910, however, mule-spinning continued to be heavily preferred to ring-spinning. For this reason, the slow adoption of ringspinning has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining e¢ciency and conservatism (Musson [1959] ). Sandberg [1969] challenged the interpretation of the slow adoption of ring spinning as evidence of the ineptitude of the British entrepreneurs. He calculated the cost and bene…ts of mule versus ring-spinning, and concluded that the choice of production technique was rational. Lancashire cotton …rms were adopting rings for the production of the coarser types of cotton yarn for which the ring was superior to the mule.
Lazonick [1981, 1981b] revived the hypothesis that Lancashire cotton …rms were managed by inept entrepreneurs. Lazonick con…rmed Sandberg's conclusions that Lancashire "businessmen performed admirably as neoclassical managers," but he also advanced the hypothesis that they "failed as entrepreneurs." 3 Lazonick showed that entrepreneurial failure was systematic across the cotton industry, and did not only involve "scattered cases of entrepreneurial success or failure." 4 The central tenet of Lazonick's argument was the following. In the last quarter of the 19th century, most of the Lancashire cotton …rms were either spinning cotton or weaving yarn. Some vertically integrated …rms were both spinning and weaving on the same site. Lazonick argued that the cost of shipping ring yarn was signi…cantly higher for non-integrated …rms than it was for integrated …rms, while the di¤erence was inconsequential for mule yarn. Rings spun the yarn on a heavy wooden bobbin that needed to be rewound, while mules spun yarn on small and light packages ready to be woven. For some type of yarn, the di¤erence of the transportation costs was so large that a non-integrated …rm would have never found it pro…table to adopt ring spinning. Lancashire businessmen should have then vertically integrated but did not, failing to "recognize that managers from time to time (as innovating entrepreneurs), overcome 'given' constraints and on a more regular basis (as supervisors of the enterprise) alter 'given' constraints." 5 The constraint that Lancashire cotton …rms did not overcome was the vertical organization of cotton production. 6 Saxonhouse and Wright [1984] challenged Lazonick's claim that the Lancashire cotton …rms did not adopt rings because of the vertical organization of the industry. First, they used data from the records of British textile machinery companies to show that the Lancashire cotton …rms did not adopt an innovation (paper-tubes) that would have reduced the transportation costs associated with ring spinning. 7 They inferred that transportation costs had to be lower than what Lazonick computed, because otherwise the British …rms would have adopted the innovation. 8 Second, they used the same records of British textile machinery companies to develop a cross-country comparison 5 Lazonick [1981] , p. 90. 6 See Lazonick, pp. 396-397 [1984] for more on this. Temin [1988, page 906] has argued that the ease of access to capital made the formation of integrated concerns easier in North America. Following Temin's argument, this is equivalent to saying that if in Lancashire there had been easy access to capital, cotton …rms would have chosen vertical integration over specialization. However, information at the …rm-level shows that many …rms were sharing power, plants, and possibly power-looms. As Gatrell [1977, page 105] wrote, in the 1820s and 1830s, credit was available to all producers in these years: "by 1835, it was claimed that 'most' new …rms were being set up on borrowings of up to two-thirds of the value of buildings and machinery combined." 7 Saxonhouse and Wright use the data from the records of British textile machinery companies to also con…rm one of Lazonick's …nding, which is that British cotton spinners maintained their commitment to the mule in new installations until World War I. 8 In his reply to Saxonhouse and Wright, Lazonick [1987] made a useful distinction between twist and weft yarn, which Saxonhouse and Wright essentially accepted: paper tubes would have ensured lower transportation costs only for twist (warp) yarn, not for weft yarn. Thus, Saxonhouse and Wright's main point remained valid as far as warp yarn was concerned: Lancashire cotton …rms did not adopt it to as great of an extent as they should have if transportation costs were as important as Lazonick had claimed in his previous work.
between Britain, New England, and Japan. 9 On one hand, they pointed out that New England had a vertically integrated cotton industry but never attained international competitiveness. 10 On the other hand, they highlighted the case of the Japanese cotton industry, which rapidly captured the world markets in the 1920s and 1930s while switching from mules to rings, but never wove more than 30 percent of its yarn on a vertically integrated basis. 11 Using this stark contrast between the British, Japanese and New England experiences, Saxonhouse and Wright concluded that vertical specialization was not, per se, an obstacle to ring adoption.
In recent work, Leunig [1996 Leunig [ , 2001 further investigated the di¤erences in transportation costs associated with ring and mule spinning. Leunig broke down the distribution of spinners and weavers in Lancashire and assessed how much yarn was spun and woven in each district. He constructed proxies for yarn output and weaving capacity, and identi…ed these districts where weaving capacity exceeded total spinning output. He called these the "co-located" districts. All spinners in a "colocated" district could have sold all of their yarn to weavers within their districts. The critical point made by Leunig is that non-integrated …rms in "co-located" districts could escape the problem of 9 Saxonhouse and Wright [2009] further investigate the evolution of ring spinning at global, national and …rm levels, and track adoption decisions in a large number of countries over a span of more than …fty years. The result of their investigation is a case study in global competition between contending technological paradigms.
1 0 See Leunig [2003] for an analysis of productivity in the Lancashire and New England cotton spinning industries at the beginning of the 20th century. 1 1 Lazonick addressed this second point made by Saxonhouse and Wright in a paper with Mass (Mass and Lazonick [1990] ). Lazonick and Mass claimed that the explanation of Japan's success was in its "planned co-ordination," which dominated the "market co-ordination" of the Lancashire industry. That is, spinning-only …rms as well as merchants (or trading companies) co-ordinated the vertical structure of the industry so that even though they never wove more than 30 percent of its yarn (mostly for the export trade) on a vertically integrated basis, it still acted as if it was fully vertically integrated. The crucial question here is, how do we measure the extent of vertical co-ordination? More speci…cally, how can we determine in some quanti…able fashion whether the Japanese cotton industry was more vertically "co-ordinated" than the British one? In contrast to the original article by Lazonick [1984] , Mass and Lazonick [1990] does not provide a sharp and de…nitive testable hypothesis, just an interesting perspective on the di¤erences between the Japanese and the British cotton industries at the beginning of the 20th century. For more on this, and for a more detailed discussion of the role of merchants as co-ordinating agents in the Lancashire cotton industry, see Broadberry and Marrison [2002] and Farnie [2004] . transport costs. Hence, by contrasting the ring adoption patterns of integrated and non-integrated …rms in co-located districts, Leunig tested whether the vertical organization of a …rm acted as a constraint in the adoption of rings. Leunig found that rings were the clear majority choice for both vertically integrated and co-located …rms, whereas mules were the clear majority choice for vertically isolated …rms. Leunig also concluded that vertical specialization was not per se an obstacle to ring adoption.
A fundamental unifying feature of the works by Sandberg, Lazonick, Saxonhouse and Wright, and Leunig is that they all use aggregate data to investigate a fundamentally …rm-level issue, the adoption of ring-spinning. To be able to infer something about …rm behavior from aggregate data, these authors used very clever arguments. Here, I take a di¤erent approach. Instead of relying on some very sophisticated deductive arguments, I let the data speak.
The main contribution of this paper is to use …rm-level data from the entire population of Lancashire cotton …rms over several years to investigate the organizational and technological choices of the cotton …rms in Lancashire. The data are from the Worrall's Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Directories for 1885, 1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910. 12 In practice, I collected and organized data for thousands of …rms, and classi…ed them as spinner-only, weaver-only, or vertically integrated …rms. This makes it possible to directly test arguments that Lazonick used to claim that British entrepreneurs failed as entrepreneurs. I also match information from the Worrall's Directories with maps of Preston and Blackburn extracted from the Ordnance Survey, 1891-92. This allows me to 1 2 Lazonick [1981] used the same data source for 1907 and 1910, but mainly at an aggregate level. The only …rm-level information that Lazonick uses from the Worrall's directory concerns the 2100 ring spindles in all of Lancashire that spun weft in a non-integrated mill (Lazonick [1981] , p. 98). Leunig [1996 Leunig [ , 2001 uses data from Worrall's Directory in 1905 to argue that the adoption rates of rings to spin weft yarn were not di¤erent between vertically integrated and non-integrated …rms. check Leunig's theory of co-location using …rm-level data.
First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its …rms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring-spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated …rms were the …rst to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of …rms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated …rms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of …rms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of …rms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that …rms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time.
Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated …rms adopted rings suddenly accelerated after 1902. This is a novel and striking …nding that had not been uncovered till now. I interpret this …nding as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated …rms.
The paper is organized as follows. I provide a description of the cotton manufacturing process in Section (2) . The new dataset is brie ‡y described in Section (3). Section (4) investigates how the deductive arguments used by Sandberg, Lazonick, Saxonhouse and Wright, and Leunig fare when …rm-level data is used. Section (5) proposes an explanation for why vertically integrated …rms started adopting rings only after 1902. Section (6) concludes.
A Brief Introduction to the Production of Cotton
Cotton Spinning and Weaving. The production of cotton can be summarized in four successive steps: cleaning the raw cotton; 13 "spinning", or transforming the cleaned raw cotton into yarn;
"weaving" the yarn into cotton cloth; and the …nishing operations, such as "bleaching", "dyeing" and "printing". In this paper I focus on the spinning and weaving processes. 14 The basic function of the spinning process is to bind the …laments together into one strand by means of twisting it, and ensure that the resulting yarn resists the strain which it will have to undergo when woven. After being twisted, the yarn is wound into a package to be shipped to weavers. These two sub-processes, twisting and winding, can either be done continuously (using rings) or intermittently (using mules).
Weaving consists of combining two sets of threads, one of which is immobile (the warp or twist), and the other which moves normally to the …rst and …lls it (the weft). 15 Technological Progress. There are three technological periods for weaving. First, between 1800 and 1830, the hand-loom was used to produce all cloths. Often, spinning was done in factories, while weaving was either outsourced to households, or done in sheds attached to the factory. By 1830, the power-loom was perfected and could be used to weave coarse and medium cloth. Cloths 1 3 Cleaning consists of loosening the mass of …bers that form the original status of the raw cotton into a clean set of individual …bres parallel to each other. This is done by passing the raw cotton through rollers, and this operation is called "carding". If the cotton is of a …ne quality, an additional operation, called "combing", is performed on it, to remove …bers that are too short and ensure a parallel position for the remaining ones. Finally, the …bers are combined together ("drawing" and "roving") and attenuated so that the resulting …laments are uniform in thickness before going through the subsequent spinning process. 1 4 During the cleaning process some of the cotton is wasted. Some of this waste is lost, but some is recovered through the "condenser system". Because the …nal product which is obtained from the condenser system is very special and di¤erent from the product obtained from the standard processes of spinning and weaving, it is not considered here. See Robson [1957] for more on this. 1 5 The result of spinning was either warp or weft yarn. The …rst had to be stronger than the second, since it will serve as the frame of the cloth, while the weft will be used to …ll the twist to form the cloth. Weft would use cotton that is 7 percent shorter than that needed for ring warp (Leunig [1996] ). that used yarn of counts of up to 60 could be woven in 1841 with power looms. Between 1850 and the 1880s, the power-loom was extended to the production of …ne cloth. In 1894 the automatic loom was invented in the US, but it was adopted very slowly in Britain.
There are two technological periods in spinning. The …rst period goes from 1820 until the early 1880s. In these years, the self-acting mule was used by all spinners. Then in the early 1880s, the ring-frame was perfected for spinning coarse and medium cloths and was slowly adopted by British entrepreneurs.
Fineness. Cotton yarn is normally classi…ed as coarse, medium, or …ne. The unit of measure of …neness is the "hank". A hank of cotton yarn or twist always measure 840 yards. If the count of 1 is reported, this means that one hank of cotton yarn weighs one pound. If the count of 40 is reported, this means that forty hanks of cotton weigh one pound. 16 The more hanks that are needed to make one pound, the …ner the yarn is. Thus, a count of 120 means that the yarn is very …ne, a count of 40 means that the yarn is of medium …neness, and a count of 2 means that the yarn is very coarse.
Ring versus Mule Spinning. Ring-spinning subjected cotton to more strain: for any given count, mule spinning could use raw cotton of lesser quality relative to what ring-spinning could use. Ring spinning required a longer cotton staple and, since the price of cotton increased with length, the raw input was potentially more costly under ring-spinning. Leunig calculates the cost di¤erentials of raw cotton between ring and mule spinning. 17 He convincingly shows that the premium started slightly in the range of counts 20 to 30 and increased with count spun. 18 Rings required unskilled or semiskilled female labor, while mule spinning used highly skilled male labor. Furthermore, ring-spinning was faster. In the same amount of time, one ring spindle could produce 1:45 times more than one mule spindle. 19 Sandberg, Lazonick and Leunig concluded that, as far as labor costs were concerned, ring-spinning was cheaper than mule spinning for all counts. Leunig showed that labor cost savings increased in the count spun. 20 Mule weft yarn was wound into packages that were lighter than the wooden bobbin needed for ring weft yarn. Sandberg showed that ring spinning increased the transportation costs of weft yarn by 200 percent. Lazonick showed that it cost as much to return bobbins as to send them, and that there was always the possibility that some or all of the bobbins would be lost or broken. The extra cost per pound of shipping ring weft would then rise by 500 percent. Transportation costs for twist yarn varied much less: Leunig …nds the transport cost of shipping ring twist yarn to be larger by a value between 24 percent and 100 percent. 21 Vertical Organization of the Industry. There were four types of …rms in the industry. Each type of …rm could own more than one plant.
The …rst two types were …rms that specialized in either spinning or weaving. For example, the …rm E. & W. Bolling owned four plants in Bolton in 1833, and the four of them were dedicated only to spinning. These were vertically specialized …rms, or spinning-only or weaving-only …rms.
Then there were …rms that were vertically integrated in a strict sense: they were spinning and 1 8 Normally weft yarn is of higher count than twist yarn. For example shirtings were produced with twist counts in the 20s and weft counts in the 30s (Cotton Manufactures, Report of the Tari¤ Board on Schedule I of the Tari¤ Law, House of Representatives, Washington, 1912 Manchester where 931 spinners and 471 weavers worked. These were vertically integrated …rms.
Finally, there were …rms that were vertically integrated in a loose sense: they were both spinning and weaving but in two di¤erent plants. For example, the …rm Had…eld and Frost owned two plants in Warrington in 1833: one plant had 143 spinners while the other plant had 192 weavers. These were vertically combined …rms. 22 There is a rich literature on the advantages and disadvantages of specialization in the production of cotton. On one hand, Farnie [1979, page 319] has argued that "by compartmentalizing technical knowledge", vertical specialization "accentuated the vertical ignorance of both spinners and manufacturers, [...] it insulated spinners from the ultimate market for woven goods, hindered them from producing the yarns best suited to speci…c types of cloth." Similarly, using data from the 1841 Inspector Horner's Factory Reports, Gatrell [1977] argues that if there were advantages for the …rms that were spinning and weaving, then these advantages were not derived from their larger size in and of itself, but from "internal economies in the costs otherwise incurred in selling, buying, and transporting yarns." On the other hand, Jewkes [1930, page 96] argued that specialization gave …rms the ability to adapt to "the changing conditions of the market and the scale of production:
[...] the multiplicity of …nished products and the di¤erent technique demanded for maximum ef…ciency in spinning and weaving …rms [forced] the separation in the ownership and control of the two processes." Also, Huberman [1990] has argued that after 1850, "new …rms tended to specialize in spinning or weaving because large integrated …rms faced a managerial constraint [because they were] unable to monitor and supervise their work forces e¤ectively." 23 Saxonhouse and Wright [1984, page 518] also claimed that "the newer …rms and mills were specialized and, in conjunction with highly developed markets and marketing facilities, [...] were able to exploit distinct managerial talents and abilities as well as economies of long production runs for standard counts of yarn". In this paper, I stay away from determining which of those advantages and disadvantages dominated, and I only look at the ring adoption behavior of the two organizational forms.
Data
The The report presents a section that associates the range of counts for yarn to the type of cloth produced: for example, "Heavy Sheeting" is produced with twist yarn of count 12, and with weft yarn of count 16. Another example is "Shirting", which is produced with twist yarn of count 28 and weft yarn of count in the 30s. This classi…cation does not cover all the types of clothes. When a 2 3 Huberman [1990] , page 683.
type of cloth is not included, I look for a …rm that also produces another type of cloth that is in the book and infer the classi…cation for the one that is not in the book. Then I used the information from the Worrall's Directories. I reasonably assumed that …rms producing both yarn and cloth will choose a range of counts for yarn that can be used by their weavers to produce cloth. I have done a consistency check between the two methods and the results are perfectly consistent. The results are presented in the The last rows of Table 2 show that the number of spinner-only …rms increased between 1890
and 1910, while the number of vertically integrated …rms declined.
Just by looking at Table 2 , it is already di¢cult to reconcile the dramatic increase in the number of spinner-only …rms, and in their capacity of spindles, with the idea that vertical integration was 2 4 In practice, to classify the product I have proceeded as follows. I have identi…ed …ve classi…cations: very coarse ("1"), coarse/medium ("12"), medium ("2"), medium/…ne ("23"), …ne ("3").If a …rm reports that it spins yarn of count between 0 and 20, then the …rm is assigned a "1". If the …rm reports a twist count between 20 and 40, then the …rm is assigned a "2". If the …rms reports a twist count above 40, then I assign the …rm a "3". I include the upper extreme in the lower interval. For example, a count of 40 corresponds to "2". I then apply the classi…cation to weft yarn, and assign a "1" for 0-30, a "2" for 30-50 and a "3" for counts above 50. In some cases there may be uncertainty because weft and twist are in di¤erent sections. When this occurs, I follow a conservative approach, and use the twist. Often …rms produce counts that are between regions. For example, they may choose to produce yarn of count 10/30. In this case I assign the …rm a count equal to "12". If a …rm has very few spindles or few looms, then I take a conservative approach, and if the …rm gives a very large range of counts (say 10/30), then I assign it in the lower region ("1"). 2 5 My numbers are unadjusted for di¤erences in speed between rings and mules. 2 6 Lazonick, [1984] p. 394.
the most e¢cient way to manufacture cotton. It would have taken a truly impressive degree of ineptitude on the part of the British entrepreneurs to justify these patterns in the data.
Did British Entrepreneurs Fail?
In this Section, I …rst provide new evidence on the importance of transportation costs in the cotton industry. Then I check, one by one, all of the deductive arguments used by Lazonick, and see if there are fallacies with them that can be uncovered by the …rm-level data.
Transportation Costs
As discussed in the introduction, the crucial insight of Lazonick's analysis is that the transportation costs of shipping ring yarn were signi…cantly larger than those of shipping mule yarn, and thus British entrepreneurs should have vertically integrated in order to escape the higher transportation costs of shipping ring yarn. Table 3 shows the conclusions that can be drawn from the new calculations made by Leunig for labor and raw cotton costs, and the calculations made by Lazonick for transportation costs. The …rst row of Table 3 shows that vertically integrated …rms, which could escape transportation costs, should have chosen rings to produce weft and twist yarn of counts lower than 40. The second row of Table 3 shows that non-integrated …rms should have chosen rings to produce twist yarn of counts lower than 40, but should have never chosen rings to produce weft yarn.
The best place to begin the empirical analysis is to look more carefully at some evidence on the actual magnitude of transportation costs. In abstract, the transportation costs could be quite large, as Sandberg, Lazonick, and Leunig showed in their detailed analysis. The relevant issue
here is whether, in practice, the costs were actually so large. As Leunig observed, if …rms were geographically close to each other then, in practice, transportation costs would be negligible. Using aggregate data, Leunig identi…ed "co-located" districts, where weaving capacity exceeded total spinning output. Here, I take another step in this direction.
Evidence from the Ordnance Survey. were four weavers-only, one spinner-only and another vertically integrated …rm. Nothing in the data indicates whether these nine …rms were in a business relationship, but vertically integrated …rms were located in a district with several …rms that were all closely located.
Both Figures 1 and 2 tell the same tale. Firms of all types (spinners, weavers, and vertically integrated) were all located near each other. Ideally, one could construct maps for all districts and all …rms, and could even compute the distances between mills as a measure of transportation costs.
Yet the main …nding would remain the same: while transportation costs were potentially large, in practice they were most likely negligible.
Firms and Plants.
Another approach to show that transportation costs had to be negligible consists of looking for counter-examples. I look for vertically integrated …rms that do not manufacture both weft and twist in-house. This would provide evidence that even vertically integrated …rms were willing to pay the transportation costs. The driving idea is to use the distinction between plant and …rm. This distinction is important here because …rms often shared the same plant (here meant as a physical bulding), or one …rm controlled more than one plant. 27 The new …rm-level data clarify that …rms that both wove and spun might very well have been doing those two things at di¤erent plants. For example, in 1890 the …rm Taylor D. & W. located in Blackburn owned 111; 800 spindles and 2; 152 looms. The …rm distributed its production among six mills. Figure 1 shows that at least one of them, the Bridge Water Mill, was not close to any of the other …ve mills owned by the …rm. The closest mills to the Bridge Water Mill were owned by two weaver-only …rms. We do not know whether the Bridge Water Mill both spun and wove or did only one of the two. 28 In only a few exceptions is information available on how …rms distributed their productions across plants. These exceptions can be used as a counter-example to Lazonick of heterogeneity in the ratio of spindles to looms at vertically integrated …rms, which suggests that these …rms did outsource some of the weaving or spinning to specialized …rms. 29 It is inappropriate to generalize from a few …rms to the entire industry, but it is clear that the unit of observation should be the plant (mill) rather than the …rm. If the distinction between plants and …rms is introduced, then even what Lazonick classi…ed as vertically integrated …rms could have spun and woven at di¤erent plants, facing the same transportation costs as the specialized …rms. 2 8 The Worrall's directory rarely provides information on how the total spinning and weaving capacity is divided among the mills of one …rm. 2 9 In 1890 the average ratio across all the vertically integrated …rms was 55.9 spindles per loom; the standard deviation was equal to 42.2, the maximum was 408.9; and the mimimum was equal to 2.2. One might argue that the heterogeneity in the type of cloth being produced would lead to heterogeneity in this ratio. In particular, if you are producing coarse cloth you need far fewer spindles per loom than if you are producing …ne yarn. To check this possibility, I recomputed the average number of spindles per loom only for the producers of …ner goods. I found the average ratio to be equal to 58.1 and the standard deviation equal to 52.0. Thus, heterogeneity in the ratio of spindles to looms is not driven by the …neness of the cloth produced. Table 4 .a lists the …rms that reported the use of ring-spinning in 1887, 1890 and 1894. 30 I also use data from 1885 and 1887 to show whether …rms changed their vertical structure by the time they had adopted ring spinning in 1887. The …rms reported in Table 4 .a are the early adopters of rings in the Lancashire cotton industry. The table reports whether the …rm was a spinner-only (S), a weaver-only (W ) or vertically integrated (V I). I also report the name of the …rm (abbreviated), the district where the …rm was located, and the number of ring spindles that were owned by the …rm in each of those …ve years. The …rm might also report mule spindles but for sake of simplicity they are not reported in the table. If the …rm reports the number of spindles but does not say how many of them are rings vs how many are mules, then the number of spindles is reported in brackets. Table 4 .b lists the …rms that reported the use of ring-spinning in 1902, and is organized in the same fashion as Table 4 .a. Table 4 .c lists the …rms that reported the use of ring-spinning in 1910, but, for sake of brevity, does not report the number of ring spindles that they owned. 31 Column 1 of Table 5 shows the total cumulative number of …rms that adopted rings over time. In 1887, only 9 …rms reported that they had adopted ring-spinning, 3 of which were newly formed …rms relative to 1885. Of the other 6 …rms, we know that the …rm Bury Cotton Spinning Tables 4a, 4b, 4c . 3 1 This information is available from the author. It is used to construct Figure 3 . 3 2 Notwitshanding its name (manufacturing usually means that the …rm also weaves its yarn), this …rm was a spinner-only in all of the Worrall's directories that I used. My guess is that this …rm had originally been vertically integrated and then did not change its name when it discontinued its weaving operations.
The Adoption of Ring Spinning over Time and Across Types of Firms
suggesting that they thrived after the adoption of ring-spinning.
25 …rms had adopted rings by 1890. This was still a small number relative to the almost one thousand …rms that were spinning yarn in Lancashire. 58 …rms had adopted rings by 1894. By 1902, the number of …rms that had adopted rings was already 109, around 10 percent of the total number of …rms in the industry. 330 …rms, or approximately one third of the spinning …rms in Lancashire, had adopted rings by 1910. Some remarkable ones, which adopted rings more than twenty years Column 3 of Table 5 shows that until 1902 almost all of the …rms that adopted rings were incumbents in the industry. Most of these …rms, already in the industry, were adopting rings to replace old mules or to expand their production. After 1902, many new …rms adopted rings as well. This is understandable: the …rst decade of the twentieth century was a period of great expansion for the Lancashire cotton industry, and it is natural that new entrants would also adopt rings. However, the key observation here is that the large majority of …rms that adopted rings by 1910 were incumbents. The type of entrepreneurial failure imagined by Lazonick would have shown up in the data as new entrants adopting faster than the incumbents. 35 They did not. Only 24 percent of the …rms that had adopted rings by 1910 were new …rms. Table 5 reinforces this observation by showing that most of the new …rms were spinner-only …rms. This observation is particularly striking when coupled with another one, which is underscored in Column 5 of Table 5 : almost no …rm changed its organizational form (e.g. from being a spinner-only to being a vertically integrated …rm or viceversa) upon the adoption of ring spinning. Moreover, we can use the information in Tables 4a, 4b Finally, we can use Tables 4a, 4b , and 4c to look at the number of ring spindles installed in order to learn about the distribution of the number of ring spindles installed. The idea here is the following: if it had been the case that ring spindles were installed in new mills or in extensions of old mills, then we would expect …rms to install a large number of spindles. If, instead, rings were being slowly adopted to replace retired mules, then we would observe much more variation in the number of spindles. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of ring spindles installed in 1910. 36 It is clear that there was a very large number of small installations (one quarter of them was for fewer than 8200 spindles), which is hard to reconcile with the idea that they were adopted by new …rms, and it instead suggests that …rms were slowly replacing the old mules with new ring spindles.
Column 4 of

The Adoption of Rings for Weft Yarn: Integrated versus Non-integrated Firms
The last of Lazonick's arguments is that the costs of shipping ring weft yarn were enormously larger for a non-integrated …rm than for an integrated …rm. This made vertical integration even more economically e¢cient than specialization. To support this hypothesis, Lazonick claimed that "prior to World War I ring frames were rarely used for spinning weft yarns in non-integrated mills." 37
Earlier writers have assumed that vertically integrated …rms produced both twist and weft yarn. This was not necessarily true, as shown in Table 6 . The top panel of Table 6 shows the distribution of …rms in the production of weft and yarn. We observe that both in 1890 and 1910, approximately 70 percent of the vertically integrated …rms were spinning both weft and twist yarn.
The remaining vertically integrated …rms had to buy either weft or twist to weave their cloth. These …rms were buying weft yarn on the market. For example, the …rms Thornber in Burnley, Nuttal in Farnsworth, Barker in Todmorden, and others had adopted rings to produce twist yarn. They were buying the weft yarn for their weaving production (or they were selling their surplus of twist yarn on the market). As already noted, not many of the vertically integrated …rms were buying weft yarn (or selling twist yarn), but it is notable that few of these ones had actually adopted rings. This surprising result is even stronger for spinner-only …rms. Only around 60 percent of did not provide the exact number of ring spindles that they had installed. 3 7 Lazonick [1981] , page 98.
them were spinning both twist and yarn. What is particularly cogent for the analysis here is that the percentages did not change between 1890 and 1910. This necessarily implies that vertically integrated …rms did not feel that is was necessary to produce both weft and twist in order to avoid the presumed cost of shipping ring weft yarn.
The middle panel reports the results using spindleage capacity rather than the number of …rms.
Here, the results are less dramatic. In 1890 and 1910, approximately 90 percent of the spindling capacity of vertically integrated …rms was in …rms that were spinning both weft and twist yarn.
The results in the top and middle panel imply that large integrated …rms generally produced both types of yarn. Some small vertically integrated …rms produced only one of the two.
The bottom panel reports the distribution of the spindling capacity by the …neness of the cloth woven and by whether twist and weft spinning was done together. We observe that the percentages in this bottom panel basically follow the ones in the middle panel. For example, in 1890, 85:4 percent of the total spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated …rms was used in the production of coarse goods (count 0 40) by …rms that were spinning both twist and weft.
70 percent of the total spindleage capacity of the spinner-only …rms was used in the production of coarse goods (count 0 40) by …rms that were spinning both twist and weft. These percentages were largely unchanged in 1910.
There are two key insights from Table 6 . First, vertically integrated …rms that were only spinning twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910. If the costs of shipping ring weft yarn were, in practice, as large as calculated by Lazonick and Leunig, then this sub-type of vertically integrated …rms should have declined over time, but it did not. Second, the shares of spindleage capacity and the number of …rms that were vertically integrated and spinner-only …rms did not change over time. If vertical integration was really the more e¢cient way to organize cotton production, we would have observed a decline in the number and spindleage capacity of spinneronly …rms, but that did not happen.
Producing Finer Goods
To conclude this section on a positive note, I now use the new …rm-level data to provide additional evidence in favor of Leunig's explanation for Lancashire's continuing preference for the mule: the strong demand for …ne yarn and the sizeable yarn-export trade. Table 7 shows that distribution of the spindleage capacity by cloth …neness and by the organization of the …rms. In 1890, 75:6 percent of the spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated …rms was for the production of coarse goods (counts between 0 and 40). 38 Among the spinner-only …rms, 53:4 percent of the spindleage capacity was for the production of coarse goods.
The striking piece of evidence is that between 1890 and 1910 there was a dramatic decline in the percentage of spindleage dedicated to the production of coarse goods. In 1910, only 36:8 percent of the spindleage capacity of the spinner-only …rms was used to produce coarse goods, down from 53:4 percent. Similarly, 64:9 percent of the spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated …rms was used to produce coarse goods, down from 75:6 percent. Table 7 provides evidence of a highly specialized industry. Spinner-only …rms specialized in the production of …ne goods, while vertically integrated …rms specialized in the production of coarse goods. Because the spindleage capacity of spinner-only …rms was twice as large as that of vertically integrated …rms, and because ring-spinning was not the most e¢cient way to produce …ne goods, this largely explains why rings were adopted so slowly in Britain at the end of the 18th century.
Why Did Vertically Integrated Adopted Rings So Late?
A striking and novel …nding is that vertically integrated …rms had essentially not adopted any ring-spinning until 1902, and then suddenly they started adopting the rings at a faster pace than spinning-only …rms. This is clear when we look at Manchester, which simultaneously adopted rings and Northrop looms.
The crucial insight here is that automatic looms required the greater strength of ring-spun as opposed to mule-spun yarn (Sandberg [1974] ). As Sandberg explains, the complementarity between ring-spinning and automatic weaving meant that plans to install automatic looms depended on the availability of ring-spinning.
Vertically integrated …rms, which mainly produced coarse goods and whose survival was clearly at stake against foreign competitors, must have realized that they had to adopt rings in order to exploit the advantages of the automatic looms. This intepretation explains the sudden and dramatic increase in the rate of adoption of rings after 1902. 39 6 Conclusion This paper shows that the Lancashire cotton industry was highly specialized, with vertically integrated …rms producing primarily coarse goods and spinner-only …rms producing primarily yarn for …ne goods. This, together with the fact that the spindleage capacity of spinning-only …rms was twice as large as that of vertically integrated …rms and the strong demand for …ne yarn and the sizeable yarn-export trade, explains Lancashire's continuing preference for the mule.
This paper also uncovers a new important …nding: vertically integrated …rms had essentially not adopted any ring-spinning till 1902, and then suddenly they started adopting the rings at a faster pace than only-spinning …rms. Though more research is warranted to explain this …nding, here I propose an explanation based on the complementarity between ring-spinning and automatic weaving. Vertically integrated …rms had to adopt ring-spinning before adopting the automatic looms. This intuitive explanation elucidates why rings were adopted so late by vertically integrated …rms, and why automatic looms were adopted so slowly by British entrepreneurs.
Appendix
The data are from the Worrall's Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Directories of 1885, 1886 -7, 1890, 1893-4, 1902 and 1910 . These data contain information on the names of the …rms, locations, and types of spindles used by cotton …rms in Lancashire. They also contain information on the number of spindles (and looms) used by each …rm, the …neness of the product manufactured, and whether the …rm spun twist, weft, or both. Farnie [1979] discusses the reliability of the Worrall's Directories.
This Appendix discusses three data coding choices. with the information on the number of spindles and the names of the mills owned. Second, at the end of the Directories, where there is an alphabetical list of the …rms in Lancashire. These two sources of information are not always consistent with each other. Here, I take the superset of the two sets of information. In other words, if a …rm is reported to having adopted rings in either one of the locations then I code the …rm as having adopted rings. -7, 1890, 1893-4, 1902, 1910 . Notes: This classification is constructed using the products that the firms claimed to be manufacturing. This approach ensures that the classification is internally consistent with the data on spindles and mules reported in the directories. (1) If the firm was a spinner-only, then it is coded with S; weaver-only are coded with W; vertically integrated firms are coded with VI. (2) If the firm is a new entrant, then a * is reported in addition to the type of firm. 
